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5T 
his report presents the 
main findings of a public 
opinion survey aimed at 
exploring the new confli-
ct constellation within the EU and 
its consequences on the overall 
perception of the EU in the public 
sphere. The survey was conducted 
in the context of the project titled 
“Reconciling Economic and Social 
Europe: The Role of Values, Ide-
as and Politics” (REScEU) during 
the Fall of 2016. Seven countries 
were covered: France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden (he-
reafter grouped as EU6) and the 
United Kingdom. Two partially dif-
ferent questionnaires were used 
in the survey. A first questionnaire 
was administered to a sample of 
respondents in the EU6 countries, 
aimed at tapping popular attitudes 
towards EU solidarity and its va-
rious dimensions, a second was 
administered to a sample of Briti-
sh respondents with the purpose 
of investigating their attitudes and 
choices on the “Brexit” referen-
dum and post-Brexit scenarios1. 
T
he sections of this Report 
illustrate a set of coherent 
items of the questionnai-
re, broadly related to the 
four conflict lines and their under-
lying substantive questions. More 
specifically, the first section maps 
respondents attitudes toward EU 
solidarity in general. Section 2 as-
sesses respondents’ opinion on a 
set of policies and initiatives aimed 
at strengthening the EU social di-
mension. Two “special” sections 
follow. The first one presents the 
choice of which image best cap-
tures the current condition of the 
EU. The second one captures the 
attitudes of British citizens towards 
“Brexit”. The findings are broken 
down both by country and by 
some key background factors, in 
order to capture variations. Some 
boxes display longitudinal com-
parisons of our results with data 
gathered from the same questions 
included in previous surveys, or 
focus on specific relevant issues. 
Conclusions, finally, summarize 
the main results – less gloomy 
than expected – and discuss their 
wider implications.
Introduction and key findings
1
1 More detailed information about the research project and the methodology of the survey can be found in 
the methodological note at the end of this report.
6The REScEU survey’s 
key findings
  •Voters believe the EU should be 
more social. A majority of respon-
dents (61%) think the top priority for 
the EU should be ensuring social pro-
tection, whereas 39% of voters are in 
favor of ensuring fiscal stability and 
competitiveness. (Section 1.1)
  •Even though a slight plurality of 
voters (36,5%) supports the current 
“conditionality regime”, for Member 
States in need of financial assistance, 
there is a large share of responden-
ts (35%) who would support more 
cross-national solidarity. (Section 
1.2)
  •The support for open labor mar-
kets remains high (49,2%), even if 
a sizeable share of voters (20,2%) 
would like to make mobility condi-
tional on an employment contract. 
(Section 1.3)
  •The vast majority of voters suppor-
ts the access of non-nationals to 
domestic welfare benefits (81,4%). 
Among those, a sizeable share would 
reserve this right only to EU nationals 
(38,5%). In addition, a vast majority 
(65,7%) is in favor of shifting deci-
sions on immigration to the EU level. 
(Section 1.3)
  •Substantial majorities of voters re-
main worried about European inte-
gration causing loss of jobs (64,5%), 
loss of national identity (52,8%) and 
weakening of national democracy 
(60,3%). (Section 1.4)
  •In a referendum on EU membership 
the exit option would be rejected 
by the majority of voters: Germany 
(75%), France (57%), Italy (63%), Po-
land (72%), Spain (74%) and Sweden 
(57%). (Section 1.4)
  •Vast majorities would welcome EU 
funded schemes for economic and 
social investments (75,9%), the fight 
against severe poverty (75,6%), insu-
ring mobile workers (67,7%), helping 
Member States to face sudden rises 
of unemployment (77,7%). Finally, 
71,2% of respondents are in favour 
of a common EU fund compensating 
national governments and local com-
munities for the costs related to ex-
tra-EU immigration. (Section 2)
  •A majority of voters has a posi-
tive image of the EU as a “neigh-
borhood community”, i.e. as a shared 
home (23,8%) or apartment building 
(30,1%), whereas 25,8% of voters 
consider the EU just as a playground 
for economic exchanges and a mino-
rity (20,3%) sees the EU as a sinking 
ship. (Section 3)
  •In case of a new Brexit referendum, 
the majority of UK voters would 
choose to remain in the EU (56%) 
(November 2016). (Section 4)
  •The majority of British voters (51%) 
would favor a new trade agreement 
with the EU even if it implied ac-
cepting free movement of workers, 
whereas 36,9% would welcome a 
new free trade agreement only wi-
thout EU immigration. Only a small 
minority (12,1%) would be against 
a free trade agreement (November 
2016). (Section 4)
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7D
uring the last couple of 
decades the EU has wit-
nessed a growing tension 
between the social and 
the economic dimension of inte-
gration. In the wake of the financial 
crisis and the ensuing Great Re-
cession such tension has broken 
down into four distinct lines of 
conflict. The first revolves around 
the policy priorities and overall 
mission of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and pits the sup-
porters of a neo-liberal project, 
centered on market making and 
monetary/fiscal stability against a 
euro-social, growth/employment 
oriented project, supported by 
public investments and accompa-
nied by a stronger social dimen-
sion. The second line of conflict 
has to do with the issue of fiscal 
stability and, ultimately, cross na-
tional transfers. The major divi-
de here - core against peripheral 
Member States - is rooted in both 
economic interests and highly en-
trenched cultural worldviews and 
mainly runs from North to South. 
The third line of conflict has to do 
with free movement, solidarity vis-
à-vis outsiders and, more specifi-
cally, access to domestic welfare 
on the side of other EU nationals. 
On the one hand, we find the 
supporters of pan-European free 
movement and non-discrimina-
tion; on the other, supporters of 
social and cultural closure. This 
line of conflict has a recognizable 
geographical dimension, running 
from East to West. Finally, the 
fourth line of conflict concerns the 
“powers of Brussels” vis-à-vis the 
defence of domestic models and 
practices, especially in the social 
sphere. Eurosceptical formations 
have taken root almost everywhe-
re, increasing in strength and im-
pact. In addition to the theme of 
immigration and, more generally, 
of ‘’opening”, Eurosceptic parties 
point the finger at the excessive 
bureaucracy and technocratic na-
ture of the decisions of Brussels, 
claiming a return to “peoples’ 
self-determination”.
Drifting apart: 
mapping the four lines
of conflict in the EU
2
8T
he crisis has increased the 
visibility and salience of 
the traditional Left/Right 
cleavage as regards the 
mission of the EU. A ‘euro-liberal’ 
and a ‘euro-social’ view confront 
each other within the intellectual 
and political circles that stay true 
to the European cause2.
To map this first line of conflict, 
the survey asked respondents to 
define the ultimate mission of the 
European Union. A binary option 
was given: either “Ensuring fiscal 
stability as well as the internatio-
nal competitiveness of the EU in-
dustry”, or “Ensuring high levels of 
social protection and social welfa-
re for all EU citizens”. The former 
option captured a “market ma-
king” position, whereas the latter 
was interpreted as a “market cor-
recting” stance. 
More than 60% of respondents 
supported the market-correcting 
position, while 39% backed the 
market-making position (see table 
1). 
A country breakdown shows that 
the market-correcting position is 
stronger in all the covered coun-
tries. More specifically, Spain is 
the Member State in which the 
highest percentage of respon-
dents (75.1%) opted for a mar-
ket-correcting position. Somehow 
unexpectedly, Germany (63.5%) 
follows suit. 
This result contradicts the com-
mon understanding of Germany 
as the guardian of austerity, aimed 
at prioritizing monetary and fiscal 
stability, regardless of their social 
consequences. Even more surpri-
singly, France shows the smallest 
share of market-correcting sup-
porters (51.7%).
The mission of the EU: 
strengthening or correcting the power
of markets?
2 Kriesi et al. 2012; Hobolt 2014; Ferrera 2017
2.1
Table 1.
The mission of the EU: 
Market-making VS market-correcting
Market-making Market-correcting
France 48,3 51,7
Germany 36,5 63,5
Italy 43,6 56,4
Poland 43,2 56,8
Spain 24,9 75,1
Sweden 37,9 62,1
EU6 39,1 60,9
LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT
left 30,3 69,7
centre 36,4 63,6
right 49,9 50,1
OCCUPATION
self-employers 43,8 56,2
white-collar employees 40,6 59,4
manual workers 34,3 65,7
Note: Exact question: “In your opinion, which of the following objectives should be given top priority at the 
EU level? (1) Ensuring fiscal stability as well as the international competitiveness of the EU industry (2) Ensuring 
high levels of social protection and social welfare for all EU citizens.” Entries are percentages of respondents. DK 
answers (0.39% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
9T
he positioning of respon-
dents along this conflict 
line was expected to ma-
tch their individual socio-e-
conomic background and political 
leaning, with self-employed and 
right-wing respondents more likely 
to back market-making. In other 
terms, this line of conflict was 
expected to rest somehow on the 
traditional ‘Left/Right’ divide. 
The survey confirmed such 
expectations. In the first place, 
a market-making positioning is 
more likely to be found among 
self-employed (43,8%), and white 
collars (40,6%), whereas it drops 
at 34.3% among manual workers. 
By contrast, a reversed order was 
found for the market-correcting 
positioning: supporters are hi-
ghest among manual workers 
(65.7%), followed by employees 
(59.4%) and, finally, self-employed 
(56.2%).
Finally, we found a 20% variation 
linked to political and ideological 
leanings: 49,9% of those who lo-
cated themselves on the right-side 
of the political spectrum said that 
the EU should foster market dyna-
mics, compared to 30.3% of tho-
se on the left. Conversely, 69,7% 
of left-wing respondents pushed 
for an EU that aims at correcting 
market dynamics, compared to 
50.1% of right-wing voters3.
3 Respondents were asked to locate themselves on a scale ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). We recoded 
as left-wing respondents all those that placed themselves between 0 and 4 on the Left/Right scale and as 
right-wing respondents all those that rated themselves between 6 and 10. All those citizens surveyed who 
placed themselves at 5 on the Left/Right scale were recorded in the “Centre” position.
A matter of ideology and
employment status
10
Changing attitudes 
over time, 2007-2016
A 
few past surveys have co-
vered issues related to the 
ultimate purpose of the EU. 
The IntUne public opinion 
survey conducted in 2007 and 2009 
included a question almost identical 
to the one asked by the REScEU sur-
vey4. The IntUne question enables 
us to suggest a longitudinal compa-
rison in five out of six countries (Swe-
den was not included in the IntUne 
project). As evidenced by Figure 1, 
in Italy, and especially in Poland, the 
percentage of respondents suppor-
ting the market-making position in-
creased between 2007, just before 
the outbreak of the crisis, and 2016. 
By contrast, France in 2016 shows a 
slightly higher percentage of respon-
dents choosing the market-correcting 
option compared to 2007. Germany 
and Spain, apart from an increase in 
the percentage of respondents who 
opted for a market-making position in 
2009 compared to 2007, do not di-
splay interesting differences.
Figure 1.
Support for market-making
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Source: IntUne Mass Survey 2007, 2009 (Sanders et al. 2012); REScEU Mass Survey. 
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4 IntUne is an integrated project on the theme of European citizenship, which involved 29 European institutions. IntUne aimed to 
study changes in the scope, nature, and characteristics of citizenship resulting from the process of the deepening and enlargement 
of the European Union (Sanders et al. 2012). The question included in the IntUne mass survey questionnaire of 2007 and 2009 was 
as follows: “I’m going to read you two statements. Please tell me which of them comes closest to your view. (1) The main aim of the 
EU should be to make the European economy more competitive in world markets. (2) The main aim of the EU should be to provide 
better social security for all its citizens”.
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T
his line of conflict essen-
tially refers to the clash 
between the logics of fi-
scal stability, austerity and 
national responsibility on the one 
hand, and the logic of shared re-
sponsibility and solidarity on the 
other one. To capture people’s at-
titudes, respondents’ were asked 
to define “if and how financial sup-
port should be given to indebted 
countries in severe financial diffi-
culties”, and to tell “who is to bla-
me for the economic crisis”.
What kind
of solidarity?
R
espondents were requi-
red to choose among 
six “types of solidarity”, 
ranging from a virtually 
“unconditional availability” of tran-
sfers, to their “complete unavaila-
bility”. 
A relative majority of respondents, 
36.5%, chose the ‘conditionality’ 
option (in essence, the current 
status quo), meaning that tran-
sfers should be bound to specific 
domestic structural reforms (see 
Table 2). Then, 35.3% opted for 
“inter-state solidarity” (where the 
reform condition is completely or 
Table 2.
Cross-national solidarity 
Granted
without
Conditions
Soft-loans Conditionality OfferedVoluntarily Self-help
Not a 
EU task
France 15.6 17.1 36.6 7.9 17.1 5.7
Germany 10.9 15.6 44.5 7.4 15.4 6.2
Italy 17.0 29.6 35.5 7.8 8.3 1.8
Poland 11.2 19.6 30.8 18.6 12.5 7.4
Spain 16.5 24.7 37.8 5.9 9.4 5.6
Sweden 12.1 21.6 33.5 10.4 13.4 9.0
EU6 13.9 21.4 36.5 9.6 12.6 5.9
AGE
18-34 14.6 14.6 36.6 12.9 12.3 8.9
35-54 13.3 21.4 35.8 8.5 14.3 6.5
55+ 13.9 25.2 37.0 8.6 11.5 3.7
PARTY CHOICE
radical left 19.9 30.2 28.0 8.5 8.3 5.0
centre left 14.3 23.5 40.0 8.2 10.1 3.9
centre 11.3 26.1 40.2 6.1 11.5 4.8
centre right 10.9 18.4 45.2 8.3 11.7 5.4
radical right 10.9 17.3 28.8 12.7 21.6 8.7
Note: Exact question: “During the recent Eurocrisis, a number of Member States in severe economic and 
financial conditions have asked for help from the EU. This has led to the adoption of new common rules on the 
provision of financial support to heavily indebted countries. Please, indicate which of these statements comes 
closest to your view. Financial support from the EU should... (1) …be granted without conditions, in the name 
of solidarity between EU citizens and states; (2) ...take the form of soft loans, because Europeans are “all in the 
same boat”; (3) ...be accompanied by precise conditions for repayment and domestic policy reform, so as not to 
put the Monetary Union at risk; (4) ...be offered voluntarily only by those countries that consider it to be in their 
national interest; (5) ...not be provided because Member States should take responsibility for their own problems 
instead of asking money from foreign taxpayers; (6) ...not be a task for the EU to deal with”. Entries are percen-
tages of respondents. DK answers (0.66% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Cross-national solidarity:
creditors Vs debtor countries2.2
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partially relaxed), whereas 22.3% 
were in favour of voluntary forms 
of cross-national solidarity or full 
domestic liability. Finally, 5.9% of 
respondents thought that pro-
viding financial help to highly in-
debted Member States should 
not be a task of the EU (complete 
unavailability option).
As expected, looking at German 
respondents only, we found the 
‘conditionality’ category (44.5%) 
to be the prominent one, where-
as the two ‘solidarity’ categories 
(26.5%) were lower compared to 
the other Member States. It is im-
portant to note that, conversely, 
Italy and Spain display the highest 
percentages of respondents that 
opted for the ‘solidaristic’ options 
(46.6% in Italy and 41.2% in Spain) 
and the lowest percentage of re-
spondents in favour of voluntary 
transfers and  self-help (16.1% in 
Italy and 15.4% in Spain). Poland 
(18.6%) features the highest num-
ber of respondents in the ’offered 
voluntarily” category, while Swe-
den in the ‘self-help’ one (13.4%)5.
The role of
Ordo-liberalism 
in German public 
opinion (2011)
G
erman views are not surpri-
sing and largely reflect key 
traits of the Country’s poli-
tical culture, rooted in the 
Protestant tradition. The high propor-
tion of German respondents that op-
ted for the ‘conditionality’ option can 
be linked, among other factors, to the 
‘ordoliberal’ doctrine that predomina-
tes among German political and eco-
nomic elites6. Earlier data from the Eu-
robarometer 76.1 of September 2011 
had already provided clear signals in 
this direction. A question included in 
EB 76.1 asked whether respondents 
agreed or did not agree with the fol-
lowing statement: “In times of crisis, 
it is desirable for (OUR COUNTRY) 
to give financial help to another EU 
Member State facing severe econo-
mic and financial difficulties”. Only 
slightly more than half of the German 
respondents (54.9%) supported the 
provision of financial help to Member 
States in economic and financial dif-
ficulties, thus indicating the extent to 
which this issue is controversial. 
This proportion is the second lowest 
(after France, 52.9%) in the EU6 sam-
ple of countries included in the RE-
ScEU Mass Survey. Two additional 
questions included in EB 76.1 asked 
for the main reason why respondents 
agreed or disagreed with the money 
transfers. Only 47.4% of German re-
spondents answered that transfers 
should be provided in the name of 
European solidarity, while the average 
proportion of respondents who sup-
ported this motivation in the other five 
countries included in our study was 
61.9%. 50.4% of German respon-
dents had a propensity for a more 
pragmatic option, i.e. that financial 
help should be provided because it is 
in the economic interest of Germany. 
Even more striking is the main motiva-
tion provided by German respondents 
who disagreed with transfers. 85.7% 
of them thought they should not pay 
for others’ economic problems, si-
gnalling the Germans’ positive bias 
toward the view according to which 
each Member State is responsible 
for its bad economic conditions. This 
proportion is significantly higher than 
the average of the other five countries 
included in the study (67.5%).
5 Since Poland and Sweden are not part of the European Monetary Union (EMU), these countries are not 
directly concerned by the transfers that EU institutions provide to states in severe financial difficulties. It is 
highly plausible that Polish and Swedish respondents are afraid of the potential involvement of their govern-
ments in arrangements that lead to the provision of such financial help.
6 The influence of Protestant values and of Ordoliberal views on Germany’s EU policy and cross-national 
solidarity is one of the main themes explored by the REScEU project. See Hien, J., Joerges, C.,  2017
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Millennials not so 
solidaristic
U
nexpectedly, the so-cal-
led ‘millennials’, namely 
younger respondents 
aged between 18 and 
34, display a lower propensity for 
inter-state solidarity7. Only 29.3% 
of them supported the solidaristic 
options, compared to 34.8% of the 
respondents between 35 and 54 
years, and 39.2% of older respon-
dents (55 years old or more). Mo-
reover, the 18-34 cohort is leaning 
more ‘toward self-help’ (25.2%) 
and ‘not a EU task’ (8.9%), if com-
pared to respondents aged 35 ye-
ars old or more. Finally, the results 
show that support for unconditio-
nal inter-state transfers, tends to 
be higher among the more infor-
med and more sophisticated vo-
ters.
A matter of 
party affiliation
T
he ‘conditionality’ option is 
the favourite among main-
stream party voters (defi-
ned here as either centre, 
centre-left or centre-right). Voters 
of radical-left or radical-right par-
ties8 opted instead for inter-state 
solidarity and the partial ‘mutua-
lisation’ of debt, with a 50.2% 
of support among parties such 
as, for instance, Syriza in Greece 
and Podemos in Spain. By con-
trast, the proportion of opponen-
ts to inter-state solidarity (‘toward 
self-help’) is highest among vo-
ters of radical-right wing parties 
(34.3%), such as Alternative für 
Deutschland in Germany, Front 
National in France and Sweden’s 
Democrats.
7 Millennials are generally considered as the most favoured by the Europeanization process, and were thus 
expected to be the most solidaristic cohort.
8 To place political parties in the five party families identified (radical-left, centre-left, centre, centre-right and 
radical right) we relied on several sources, such as the Chapel Hill experts’ survey (www.chesdata.eu), the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/). We also took into consideration the ap-
plication of national parties to the various political groups in the European Parliament.
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B
y means of the second 
question, respondents 
were asked “who should 
be held responsible for 
the current economic problems of 
the EU”: EU institutions, the weal-
thiest Member States, the most in-
debted Member States, or banks 
and financial institutions? In a resi-
dual category respondents could 
indicate any “other actor”. Table 3 
shows the main results. More than 
40% of citizens considered banks 
and international financial institu-
tions as the main culprit, followed 
by 19.9% blaming indebted EU 
Member States. 18.7% pointed 
their finger at the EU institutions, 
while another 18.3% blamed the 
wealthiest EU Member States 
(2.2% chose the residual option). 
Although “banks and financial in-
stitutions” were blamed more or 
less everywhere, Spain features 
a staggering 59.6% peak. Stark 
differences appeared between 
Germany and Italy. While 32.9% 
of German respondents blamed 
the most indebted countries of the 
EU, only 6.9% of Italians did the 
same. On the other hand, the lat-
ter largely criticised the wealthiest 
countries (29.1%), an option that 
was hardly picked by Germans 
(8.5% ). Moreover, Italy and Spain 
are the countries in which the 
lowest proportion of respondents 
blamed EU institutions. The Uni-
ted Kingdom (26.8%) and France 
(22.1%) are instead the ones most 
critical towards Brussels9.
Table 3.
Responsible for the current 
economic crisis in the EU
Institutions
of the EU
Wealthiest EU
Member States
Most indebted EU 
Member
States
Banks and
inancial
Institutions
France 22.1 15.6 17.3 43.1
Germany 15.2 8.5 32.9 41.7
Italy 13.8 29.1 6.9 47.4
Poland 17.9 20.7 25.5 33.1
Spain 9.3 17.8 10.8 59.6
Sweden 25.5 17.8 28.6 26.5
United Kingdom 26.8 18.6 17.6 34.9
EU6 + UK 18.7 18.3 19.9 40.9
Note: Exact question: “Different actors may be considered responsible for the current economic problems of 
the EU. Who do you hold as the most responsible? (1) The institutions of the EU; (2) The wealthiest EU Member 
States; (3) The most indebted EU Member States; (4) Banks and financial institutions; (5) Other (SPECIFY)”. En-
tries are percentages of respondents. The residual category “Other” (2.2% of the total) and DK answers (0.36% 
of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
9 It is interesting to note that, despite representing just 2.2% of the total answers, 8% of respondents who 
chose the “other” option, attributed to Germany and/or the German Chancellor Angela Merkel individually 
the responsibility of the crisis. Another 17% blamed politicians in general, 8% the government of their country 
and 7% extra-EU immigration.
Who is to blame for the 
crisis?
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P
ublic attitudes on the free 
movement of workers wi-
thin Europe were tapped 
through two different que-
stions. The first one analysed to 
what extent EU citizens should be 
allowed to enter the labour mar-
ket of another Member State. The 
second one focused on the rights 
of access to social security on the 
side of foreigners.
Who should access the 
national labour market?
R
espondents were asked 
to choose between three 
options: (1) citizens from 
other EU countries can 
access the labour market freely 
and individually, (2) they can enter 
only as guest workers and only as 
long as they keep a job, (3) native 
workers should have priority ac-
cess to jobs and employment ser-
vices. Almost half of respondents 
(49.2%) argued that the domestic 
labour market should admit every 
legally resident foreign citizen, 
whereas 30.5% favoured giving 
priority to natives, and 20.2% cho-
se the intermediate option (see 
Table 4).
Poland (59.0%), Spain (49.6%) 
and Germany (51.0%) featured a 
support for openness above the 
EU6 average. A different pattern is 
detected in France, where public 
opinion seems to be polarized: 
a relative majority (45.6%) of re-
spondents claimed “French wor-
Table 4.
Workers mobility within the EU: 
should there be national filters?
Freely
and
individually
Only as
guest
workers
Priority to
nationals
France 40.0 14.4 45.6
Germany 51.0 27.4 21.7
Italy 46.9 20.9 32.2
Poland 59.0 17.7 23.3
Spain 49.6 19.3 31.1
Sweden 49.1 21.5 29.4
EU6 49.2 20.2 30.5
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
With an occupation 50.3 20.2 29.5
Unemployed 44.7 15.8 39.5
INTERNATIONALIZATION
Never Visited other EU countries 39.8 22.2 38.0
Visited other EU countries 53.4 19.3 27.2
LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT
left 58.9 19.4 21.7
centre 44.5 20.4 35.1
right 44.2 21.0 34.8
Note: Exact question: “According to EU law, EU citizens are allowed to work in every Member State. How do 
you think EU citizens of other nationalities that come to work in your country should access the labour market? 
(1) Freely and individually, just like me and my national fellows; (2) As guest workers and only as long as they keep 
the job that let them in (OUR COUNTRY); (3) (NATIONALITY) workers should have priority access to jobs and 
employment services.” Entries are percentages of respondents. DK answers (0.36% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Opening VS closure:
Workers mobility and access to welfare2.3
kers first”, whereas 40.0% would 
grant access to all foreign citizens 
legally resident in the country.
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Who should access the 
national welfare state?
R
espondents were asked 
whether access to social 
benefits should be gran-
ted to all legally resident 
foreigners, only to nationals of 
other EU Member States, or only 
to natives. Response items ran-
ged thus from a position of com-
plete openness to full closure.
Given the salience of the topic wi-
thin the United Kingdom, both be-
fore and after the EU-referendum 
of June 2016, this question was 
also administered in Britain. 
42.9% of respondents opted for 
full openness, closely followed by 
those who thought that only EU 
citizens should be entitled to the 
same rights as natives (38.5%). 
The remaining 18.6% opted for 
the more chauvinist position (see 
Table 5). 
In Italy (55.8%), Spain (53.5%), 
Sweden (48.9%) and the United 
Kingdom (40.7%), the majority 
of respondents were in favour of 
granting unconditional access to 
welfare rights to foreigners, with 
the first three countries showing 
above average rates. By contrast, 
in Poland (50.8%), France (47.3%) 
and Germany (46.2%) the highest 
proportion of respondents opted 
for the intermediate position. The 
“closure” option is minoritarian 
in all countries. Nevertheless, in 
France the latter is shared by sli-
ghtly more than 20% of respon-
dents, and in the United Kingdom 
it reaches 32.4%. Indeed, table 
4 and 5 show that French public 
opinion is the most “welfare chau-
vinist” in the EU6 sample. 
The findings for UK are not surpri-
sing, given the frequent recourse 
to the so-called ‘benefit tourism’ 
narrative made by British poli-
ticians and the outcome of the 
‘Brexit’ referendum.
Table 5.
Domestic social protection:
who should have access to it?
All
foreigners
Only EU
citizens
No
foreigners
France 32.0 47.3 20.7
Germany 37.8 46.2 16.0
Italy 55.8 33.2 11.0
Poland 31.1 50.8 18.1
Spain 53.5 32.8 13.7
Sweden 48.9 32.9 18.2
United Kingdom 40.7 26.9 32.4
EU6 43.3 40.5 16.2
EU6 + UK 42.9 38.5 18.6
POCKETBOOK EVALUATION
Household financial situation got worse 41.6 37.5 21.0
Household financial situation stayed about the same 42.0 39.9 18.2
Household financial situation improved 46.0 38.1 15.9
EDUCATION
Up to lower secondary qualification 42.4 36.6 20.9
Upper-secondary qualification 41.9 40.1 17.9
University degree 45.1 38.6 16.4
LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT
left 54.9 33.6 11.5
centre 39.9 39.6 20.5
right 34.7 42.2 23.1
Note: Exact question: “Which of these three statements on the access to social security benefits by citizens of 
other nationalities comes closest to your own point of view? (1) All foreigners legally resident in (OUR COUNTRY) 
should have the same social security benefits as the (NATIONALITY); (2) Only nationals of other EU Member 
States, legally resident in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the same social security benefits as the (NATIONALITY); 
(3) A foreigner, even if legally resident in (OUR COUNTRY), should not have the same social security benefits as 
the (NATIONALITY).” Entries are percentages of respondents. DK answers (0.66% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
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Changing attitudes 
over time, 1992-2016
E
urobarometer 37.1 con-
ducted in April-May 1992 in-
cluded exactly the same que-
stion as the REScEU mass 
survey10. This allows for a longitudinal 
comparison – although only in two 
points in time and in five out of seven 
countries – between citizens opinions; 
in 2016, after the outbreak of the Eu-
rocrisis and the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum, and in 1992, just before 
the Maastricht Treaty came into force.
The bar charts reported in Figure 2 
compare the percentages of respon-
dents who in 1992 and in 2016 chose 
Figure 2.
Comparison between the percentages of respon-
dents for each of the response items in 1992 and 
in 2016
All foreigners, legally resident
%
 o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
France Germany Italy Spain United Kingdom
1992 2016
45,6
32,0
52,4
37,8
64,9
55,8
78,4
53,5 48,9
40,7
each of the three options. As shown, 
in the five countries in which the com-
parison is possible, the percentage 
of respondents who thought that all 
foreigners, irrespective of their coun-
try of origin, should have the same 
access to social benefits as nationals 
strongly decreased in 2016 compa-
red to 1992. Conversely, the propor-
tion of respondents who opted for 
the intermediate position, according 
to which only EU citizens should be 
entitled to the same social benefits as 
fellow nationals, significantly increa-
sed in four out of five countries. Fran-
ce and Germany, in particular, show 
a 20-points increase between 1992 
and 2016. This result highlights how, 
in recent years, extra-EU immigration 
10 Ferrera 1993. The question included in the Eurobarometer 37.1 has exactly the same wording as the que-
stion included in the REScEU Mass survey, except for the term ‘European Commission (EC)’, which in 2016 
was replaced with: ‘European Union (EU)’.
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has become a much more salient and 
threatening issue that worries Europe-
an voters. The United Kingdom repre-
sents the exception; but, as shown by 
the graph at the bottom of Figure 2, in 
this country the proportion of respon-
dents who chose a position of closure 
increased between 1992 and 2016. 
This result is not surprising given the 
extreme salience of immigration, even 
intra-EU, in the politics which led to 
the ‘Brexit’ referendum.
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11 Two main streams of literature propose explanations of which factors affect the opinion of the general 
public on this specific line of tension. The first one analyses public attitudes towards immigration (Hainmuel-
ler and Hopkins 2014); and the second one focuses on citizens’ preferences regarding the welfare state 
(Svallfors 2012) and, in particular, cross-border welfare rights (van der Waal 2010; Mewes and Mau 2012; 
Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; Hjorth 2016).
T
he academy debate uses 
two main arguments to 
explain citizens’ attitudes 
towards the openness/
closure of domestic labour mar-
kets and social protection sy-
stems11: the economic compe-
tition argument, and the cultural 
identity argument. According to 
the former, natives have an inte-
rest in limiting immigrants’ access 
to scarce resources and perceive 
openness as an economic thre-
at. The cultural identity argument 
implies instead that natives consi-
der the welfare state as a ‘natio-
nal institution that mirrors cultural 
and historical commonality; in this 
case immigrants are perceived as 
‘intruders’. 
Generally speaking, individuals 
with higher education and pro-
fessional skills, or employed in 
sectors were migrants can’t com-
pete, share cosmopolitan values 
and are thus more likely to accept 
openness. Lower education le-
vels and a strong attachment to 
the nation state correlate instead 
with an individual anxiety towards 
socio-cultural diversity and, thus, 
foster closure.
Our survey suggests that both 
dynamics are at play. As far as 
economic competition is con-
cerned, the unemployed are less 
keen (44,7%) to grant free and 
unconditional access to the la-
bour market than the employed 
(50,3%). Likewise, 39.5% of the 
unemployed would give priority to 
nationals, a share that is ten points 
higher than among the employed 
(29.5%). 
Moreover, with respect to the is-
sue of “welfare access”, we inve-
stigated the ‘economic threat’ is-
sue by asking respondents if their 
household financial situation had 
improved, stayed about the same, 
or worsened over the past 5 ye-
ars. Results show that support for 
a full access to social benefits for 
immigrants increased from 41.6% 
among households with a nega-
tive financial outlook, to 46.0% 
among those who experienced 
a positive evolution. By contrast, 
immigrants should not have the 
same social security benefits as 
nationals according to 15.9% of 
A matter of economic 
status and education
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households with a positive finan-
cial evolution, compared to 21.0% 
of their counterparts. 
In addition to the economic com-
petition argument, also the cultu-
ral identity arguments holds some 
traction. Openness was suppor-
ted by 53.4% of those who had 
visited another EU country for stu-
dy, work or leisure, compared to 
only 39.8% of those who had not. 
Conversely, closure of the labour 
market was backed by 27.2% of 
the former and 38% among the 
latter12.
Moreover, we selected the level 
of education of respondents to 
conduct a very preliminary test of 
the “cultural threat” perspective. 
As expected, positive attitudes 
towards access of foreigners to 
social security benefits were hi-
gher among university graduates 
(45.1%) than among those who 
had reached a secondary level de-
gree (42.4%). Conversely, negative 
attitudes were shared by 16.4% of 
university graduates, and 20.9% 
of lower-educated respondents.
T
raditional ideologies and 
party affiliation also play a 
role in explaining attitudes 
towards the access to the 
labour market and the welfare sta-
te. Positive attitudes towards free 
labour market access decreased 
along the ideological spectrum - 
according to self-partisan positio-
ning - from the left (58.9%), to the 
centre (44.5%), and finally to the 
right (44.2%). On the other hand, 
closure is supported by 34.8% of 
respondents who located them-
selves on the right, versus 21.7% 
of those on the left.
Likewise, when it comes to sup-
port for free access to social be-
nefits, there is a 20-point distan-
ce between individuals on the left 
(54.9%) and those on the right 
(34.7%). Conversely, the propor-
tion of respondents who opted for 
a partial or a total closure of the 
welfare state was higher among 
right-wing respondents (42.2% 
for ‘Only EU citizens’ and 23.1% 
for ‘No foreigner’), than among 
left-wing respondents (33.6% for 
‘Only EU citizens’ and 11.5% for 
‘No foreigners’).
12 The survey question on internationalisation asked as follows: “Have you ever visited another EU country 
for work, study or leisure? (1) Yes; (2) No”.
A matter of ideology
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R
espondents were invited 
to locate themselves on 
a scale that goes from 
‘0’, implying that Europe-
an integration ‘has already gone 
too far’, to ‘10’, meaning that ‘it 
should be strengthened’. Figure 
3 shows that most respondents 
(21%) chose an intermediate va-
lue (‘5’). However, the distribution 
is skewed towards a “positive at-
titude” towards further integration. 
While 55% located themselves 
between ‘6’ and ‘10’, only 24% 
identified with values between ‘0’ 
and ‘4’. Extreme positions, cap-
Figure 3.
Integration scale in the entire sample
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Note: Exact question: “Some people say the process of European unification should be strengthe-
ned. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your position using 
a 11-point-scale where ‘0’ means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and ‘10’ means it ‘should be 
strengthened’. DK answers (0.3% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
C
ompared to the other 
three lines of conflict, the 
vertical tension between 
‘Brussels’ and national 
governments is more difficult to 
capture in a ‘pure’ form (see box in 
this section). Indeed, it is generally 
linked to some specific policies, or 
to cross-cutting issues: austerity, 
the Euro, the cost of membership, 
migration, losses due to foreign 
competition, the democratic defi-
cit13.
This section of the survey was 
centered around three questions. 
First, we asked respondents 
whether they would like to see 
more or less European integration 
in general. Second, we included a 
four-item question to investigate 
whether respondents were afraid 
of some more specific hypotheti-
cal consequences of the EU inte-
gration process. Last but not le-
ast, we asked them bluntly if they 
would support an exit from the 
Union.
The powers of Brussels:
Supranational integration VS 
national sovereignty
2.4
13 Ferrera 2017
More or less Europe?
22
tured by values ‘0’ and ‘10’, were 
chosen by 8.7% and 15.3% of the 
sample, respectively showing ne-
vertheless a certain polarization.
In Poland, Italy and Spain the 
skewedness of the preferences di-
stribution seems to be even stron-
ger. In particular, in Italy (24%) and 
Spain (25%), a relative majority of 
respondents located themselves 
at the positive end of the scale. As 
reported in Table 6, in Italy, Poland 
and Spain the average value ran-
ged between 6.1 and 6.9: a score 
that is significantly higher than in 
the other countries. In France and 
in Sweden the average is 5.8 and 
Table 6.
Country average values and standard
deviations on the integration scale
Mean St. Dev.
France 5.8 3.1
Germany 5.5 2.8
Italy 6.5 3.0
Poland 6.1 2.7
Spain 6.9 2.6
Sweden 5.1 2.7
United Kingdom 4.9 3.0
EU6 6.0 2.9
EU6 + UK 5.8 2.9
Note: For the question wording see note of Figure 3.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
5.1 respectively, but one respon-
dent out of ten said that “the inte-
gration process has already gone 
too far”. Germany shows the most 
balanced distribution. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom the 
share of respondents who think 
that the unification process has 
already gone too far (categories 
0 to 4) is higher than the share of 
those who think that it should be 
strengthened (see Figure 4). This 
distribution is also reflected by 
the British average value on the 
integration scale (4.9) that is the 
lowest of the country sample.
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Figure 4.
Integration scale in the seven countries 
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Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
What scares people 
about European integra-
tion? 
T
o dig into the fears of re-
spondents related to the 
integration process, we 
employed a four item que-
stion. People could link their wor-
ries to: the loss of jobs and social 
security, the growing share of na-
tional income being paid into the 
EU budget, the loss of national 
identity and culture, or the weake-
ning of national democracy. 
As Table 7 shows, on average, 
about 60% of citizens were ge-
nerally afraid of these potential 
effects of the integration process. 
The most pressing issue was the 
potential loss of jobs and social 
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Table 7.
Fears about the process of EU integration 
A) Loss of job and social security B) A growing share of national income being paid into the EU budget
Not afraid Afraid Not afraid Afraid
France 30.4 69.6 32.5 67.5
Germany 47.4 52.6 37.1 62.9
Italy 30.0 70.0 49.6 50.4
Poland 48.5 51.5 39.2 60.8
Spain 12.1 87.9 29.6 70.4
Sweden 44.7 55.4 43.6 56.4
EU6 35.5 64.5 38.6 61.4
C) Loss of national identity
and culture
D) A weakening of 
national democracy
Not afraid Afraid Not afraid Afraid
France 37.8 62.6 33.0 67.0
Germany 51.1 48.9 44.0 56.1
Italy 48.5 51.5 38.7 61.3
Poland 56.8 43.2 48.2 51.8
Spain 36.4 63.6 31.2 68.8
Sweden 52.6 47.5 43.4 56.6
EU6 47.2 52.8 39.7 60.3
Note: Exact question: “Some people have fears about the process of European unification. How much are you 
currently afraid of? a) The loss of jobs and social security in (OUR COUNTRY); b) A growing share of national 
income being paid into the EU budget; c) The loss of national identity and culture; d) A weakening of national 
democracy.” Entries are percentages of respondents. Response categories “Very much afraid” and “somewhat 
afraid” have been recoded in the category “Afraid”, while categories “Not much afraid” and “Not afraid at all” 
have been recoded in the category “Not Afraid”. DK answers (a. 0.18% of the total; b. 0.96% of the total; c. 
0.21% of the total; d. 0.41% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
security (see panel A), a topic clo-
sely intertwined with more than 
one of the four lines of conflict. 
However, the prominence of this 
item (64.5%) was driven by some 
outliers, such as Spain, where this 
specific issue concerns 87.9% of 
respondents. Spain was followed by 
Italy and France, where 70.0% and 
69.6% of respondents expressed 
the same fear. Polish responden-
ts, instead, were the least worried 
about the loss of jobs and social 
security (51.5%).
The remaining three items show a 
similar pattern, with Spanish and 
French respondents being the 
most afraid about increased con-
tribution to the EU budget (panel 
B), the weakening of national de-
mocracy (panel D), and the loss of 
national identity and culture (panel 
C). However, contrary to the gene-
ral Eurosceptic claim, the under-
mining of domestic traditions and 
practices by the EU was the least 
of concerns. On average, it scored 
“only” 52.8% among respondents 
in the sample. Moreover, in Poland 
(43.2%) and Sweden (47.5%), the 
share is below 50%, while the 
German sample is almost split in 
half (48.9%). French respondents 
turned out to be the most chauvi-
nist (62.6%).
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Would you “exit” the 
Union?
F
or the ‘integration vs auto-
nomy’ line of tension, the 
ultimate litmus test is the 
extent of support for the exit 
option. Overall, such option was 
rejected by the majority of voters 
in our sample. Two out of three 
respondents said that they would 
vote for their country remaining in 
the EU (66.2%), while 24.7% of 
them would vote for leaving; the 
remaining 9.1% declared that they 
would not vote (see Table 8).
‘Remainers’ were highest in Ger-
many (75.1%), followed by Spain 
(73.8%). ‘Exiters’ were highest in 
France and Sweden, where more 
than 34%14 of respondents would 
‘leave’ the Union. 
The remain option is especial-
ly backed by the group aged 55 
years or more (76.5%), those with 
a university degree (74.8%), and 
leftist respondents (75.5%). “Lea-
vers” were over-represented within 
those aged between 35 and 54 
(32.1%), those with a upper-se-
condary qualification (26.9%), and 
right-wing voters (31.1%). The 
youngest respondents (18-34 ye-
ars old) were the most inclined to 
abstain (12.5%).
Table 8.
Vote choice in a potential referendum
on exit from the EU 
Remain Leave Not vote
France 56.5 34.1 9.4
Germany 75.1 16.5 8.4
Italy 63.1 28.6 8.3
Poland 71.8 17.3 11.0
Spain 73.8 16.4 9.8
Sweden 57.4 34.7 7.9
EU6 66.2 24.7 9.1
AGE
18-34 62.2 25.3 12.5
35-54 56.5 32.1 11.4
55+ 76.5 18.3 5.3
EDUCATION
Up to lower secondary qualification 63.1 25.8 11.1
Upper-secondary qualification 63.7 26.9 9.4
University degree 74.8 19.5 5.8
LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT
left 75.5 18.6 6.0
centre 60.5 24.1 15.4
right 62.5 31.1 6.3
Note: Exact question: “If (COUNTRY) should call for a referendum on its membership in the European Union, 
how would you vote? 1) To make (COUNTRY) remain a member of the EU; 2) To make (COUNTRY) leave the EU; 
3) I would not vote.” DK answers (0.75% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
14 The voting behaviour in this hypothetical referendum expressed by one third of French respondents seems 
to be in line with the attitudes that they express on the closure of the labour market and social security on 
the side of foreign workers and their general opinion on the integration process.
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The intersection 
between lines of 
conflict
A
s already noted, the vertical 
divide is difficult to capture 
in a pure form because it 
overlaps with and cross-
cuts the issues captured by the other 
three lines of tension. Thus, we analy-
zed whether and how respondents’ 
attitudes toward integration varies 
Table 9.
Factors affecting opinions
on integration process 
0-10 integration scale
(average value)
T Test
(p value)
EU MISSION  2.395*
Market-making 6.1
Market-correcting 5.9
CROSS NATIONAL SOLIDARITY 14.400***
Solidarity 6.4
Self-help 5.1
ACCESS TO WELFARE BY FOREIGNERS 21.903***
Opening to all foreigners 6.3
Closure toward foreigners 4.5
VOTE FOR EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES 11.761***
No 6.2
Yes 5.2
Note: For the question wording see note of Figure 4. Entries are mean values on the 0-10 scale. Significance 
level ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
according to the preferences expres-
sed for the questions emblematically 
linked to the four lines of conflicts. 
Table 9 shows the average values 
on the 0-10 integration scale for the 
entire sample, broken down by the 
opposite poles of the variables that 
measure the other three conflicts. We 
ran a t-test to understand whether the 
differences between different catego-
ries of respondents were statistically 
significant.
T
here is only a slight differen-
ce in the mean value on the 
integration scale between 
‘market-making’ and ‘mar-
ket-correcting’ positions. This dif-
ference is only weakly significant in 
statistical terms. This result is not sur-
prising, considering that the left/right 
divide at the supranational level does 
not question integration as such, but 
it contrast two opposite views on the 
ultimate mission of the EU. If we look 
at positions on the ‘core VS periphery 
conflict’ and the ‘free movement’ 
conflict, we discover more statistically 
and substantially significant differen-
ces in the mean values on the integra-
tion scale. We detect more favourable 
attitudes towards integration among 
respondents who are inclined to sup-
port cross-national solidarity and the 
opening of social protection systems 
to foreign citizens, compared to those 
who opt for self-help and for closure. 
Finally, we analyzed how opinions on 
EU unification differ between those 
who had voted for a Eurosceptic par-
ty and supporters of traditional politi-
cal forces. As expected, the average 
value on the integration scale among 
supporters of a pro-EU party is stati-
stically higher than the value of those 
who voted for a Eurosceptic party.
3
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T
he REScEU Mass Survey 
included a number of que-
stions aimed at capturing 
potential support for stren-
gthening the EU social dimension, 
through specific measures dealing 
with the fight against poverty and 
unemployment, economic and so-
cial investments, and migration.
Reconciliation: 
policies for a more social Europe
3
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F
or what concerns the issues 
of poverty and unemploy-
ment, a first question asked 
respondents if, in case of 
a very severe financial crisis in a 
given Member State, they thou-
ght that the EU should make sure 
that no citizen of said state remai-
ned without means of subsistence 
(food, shelter, essential medicines 
etc.). Here the implicit suggestion 
is that EU financial assistance pro-
grams should see to it that national 
governments provide a minimum 
safety net. The second que-
stion asked citizens whether they 
would support the introduction of 
a EU-funded benefit scheme for 
people in severe poverty. The third 
one asked respondents whether 
they would approve a EU budget 
large enough to support a scheme 
against unemployment.
Almost all respondents (89.1%) 
agreed that the EU should ensu-
re that no citizen remained without 
means of subsistence. In the EU6 
sample this proportion was higher 
Table 10.
Pan-European solidarity:
EU measures against poverty 
A) Financial help to make anyone wi-
thout basic means of subsistence
B) A EU funded benefit scheme
for people in severe poverty
Disagree Agree Not in favour In favour
France 15.4 84.6 34.7 65.3
Germany 12.7 87.3 30.3 69.7
Italy 4.7 95.3 13.5 86.5
Poland 11.6 88.4 24.7 75.3
Spain 6.7 93.3 9.5 90.5
Sweden 14.4 85.6 33.6 66.5
EU6 10.9 89.1 24.4 75.6
Note: Exact questions: a) “EU Member States have decided that their social and economic policies should be 
brought closer together. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. (1) In case 
of a very severe financial crisis in a given Member State, the EU should make sure that no citizen of that state 
remains without means of subsistence (food, shelter, essential medicines etc...)”. Response categories “Strongly 
agree” and “Somewhat agree” have been recoded in the category “Agree”, while the categories “Somewhat 
disagree” and “Strongly disagree” have been recoded in the category “Disagree”. Entries are percentages of 
respondents. DK answers (0.40% of the total) are excluded. b) “Thinking about the European Union over the next 
10 years, can you indicate whether you are in favour or against the following? (1) The introduction of a EU fun-
ded benefit scheme for people in severe poverty all over the EU” Response categories “Strongly in favour” and 
“Somewhat in favour” have been recoded in the category “In favour”, while categories “Somewhat against” and 
“Strongly against” have been recoded in the category “Against”. DK answers (0.68% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Pan-European solidarity I: 
A EU wide poverty and 
unemployment scheme?
3.1
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than 84%. In addition, more than 
three respondents out of four were 
in favour of a specific EU funded 
scheme to fight poverty. In Italy 
(86.5%) and Spain (90.5%), re-
spondents backed these policies 
vigorously, whereas in France, 
Germany and Sweden approval 
rates were 20 points lower. (see 
Table 10).
For what concerns the issue of 
unemployment, more than 77% 
of respondents were in favour of 
an increase of the EU budget. to 
support jobless people during a 
crisis. However, while in Spain 
and in Italy approval rates reached 
respectively 91.2% and 91.0%, 
in Germany they only reached 
64.9%. The fact that more than 
two thirds of Germans are ready 
to support a partial mutualisation 
of the risk of unemployment is ne-
vertheless remarkable, conside-
ring the reluctance of the German 
government when it comes to mu-
tualisation policies (see Table 11).
Table 11.
Pan-European solidarity:
EU measures against poverty 
Financial help to states that face a rise in unemployment
Disagree Agree
France 32,1 67.9
Germany 35,1 64.9
Italy 8.8 91.2
Poland 18.1 82.0
Spain 9.0 91.0
Sweden 30.5 69.5
EU6 22.3 77.7
Note: Exact question: “EU Member States have decided that their social and economic policies should be 
brought closer together. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. The EU 
should equip itself with a budget large enough to provide substantial financial help to Member States facing a 
sudden rise in unemployment rates” Response categories “Strongly agree” and “Somewhat agree” have been 
recoded in the category “Agree”, while the categories “Somewhat disagree” and “Strongly disagree” have been 
recoded in the category “Disagree”. Entries are percentages of respondents. DK answers (0.47% of the total) 
are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
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Table 12.
Pan-European solidarity: 
Social investments and mutualisation of risks 
A) An increase in the EU budget for 
economic and social investment B) The introduction of Eurobonds
Not in favour In favour Not in favour In favour
France 33.0 67.0 51.7 48.3
Germany 33.3 66.7 62.7 37.3
Italy 14.0 86.0 27.7 72.3
Poland 16.2 83.9 43.6 56.4
Spain 11.7 88.3 21.5 78.5
Sweden 36.3 63.7 57.9 42.1
EU6 24.1 75.9 44.1 55.9
Note: Exact question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether 
you are in favour or against the following? a) An increase in the EU budget for economic and social investments; 
b) The introduction of common European bonds (a.k.a. Eurobonds).” Response categories “Strongly in favour” 
and “Somewhat in favour” have been recoded in the category “In favour”, while categories “Somewhat against” 
and “Strongly against” have been recoded in the category “Against”. DK answers (a. 0.61% of the total; b. 
2.13% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Pan-European solidarity II: 
Fostering investments and 
the mutualisation of risks?
3.2
A 
set of questions asked 
respondents to indicate 
whether they were in fa-
vour or against an increa-
se in the EU budget for economic 
and social investments, and the 
introduction of Eurobonds.
As shawn by Table 12, more than 
three out of four respondents in 
the six countries were in favour 
of increasing the EU budget to 
foster social investment policies 
(75.9%). By contrast, ‘only’ 56% 
were in favour of the introduction 
of European bonds aimed at partly 
mutualising public debt among EU 
Member States. Country differen-
ces are quite sharp, reflecting the 
controversial nature of this issue in 
the context of the North-South line 
of conflict (see section 1.2). Whi-
le in Spain and Italy, respectively 
78.5% and 72.3% of respondents 
backed Eurobonds, only 37.3% of 
Germans did so. In France the ap-
proval rate reached 48.3%.
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3.2
sions on EU external borders con-
trol and on the status of extra-EU 
immigrants and refugees should 
be taken in Brussels. 
67.7% of respondents were in fa-
vour of common EU social insu-
rance schemes. It is remarkable 
that the support for tackling mobi-
lity issues is weaker if compared to 
the one directed at fighting pover-
ty and unemployment. Moreover, 
the issue divides North and South. 
Whereas support is high in Spain 
(88.8%) and Italy (78.0%), Ger-
many (60.8%), Sweden (59.0%) 
and France (49.3%), showed 
lower  -even if still majoritarian- 
approval rates (see Table 13).
Pan-European solidarity III: 
A EU wide insurance to support 
mobility and immigration?
3.3
T
wo questions asked re-
spondents to indicate 
whether they were in fa-
vour or against the in-
troduction of common EU social 
insurance schemes (such as he-
althcare, unemployment or pen-
sions) covering intra-EU mobile 
workers. The second question 
referred to the introduction of a 
common EU fund compensa-
ting national governments and 
local communities for the costs 
related to immigration from other 
EU Member States. Finally, the 
third question asked respondents 
whether they agreed that deci-
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Table 13.
Pan-European solidarity:
Supporting mobility and immigration
A) Common EU social insurance schemes
for intra-EU migrant workers
Not in favour In favour
France 50.7 49.3
Germany 39.2 60.8
Italy 22.0 78.0
Poland 29.8 70.2
Spain 11.2 88.8
Sweden 41.0 59.0
EU6 32.23 67.67
B) A common EU fund compensating 
national governments and local communities 
for the costs related to extra-EU immigration
Not in favour In favour
France 45.0 55.0
Germany 31.0 69.1
Italy 14.7 85.4
Poland 35.5 64.5
Spain 15.7 84.3
Sweden 31.6 68.4
EU6 28.8 71.2
C) Decisions on control of the EU external borders
and on immigrants taken in Brussels
Not in favour In favour
France 33.7 66.3
Germany 34.7 65.3
Italy 21.0 79.0
Poland 45.0 55.0
Spain 29.8 70.2
Sweden 42.2 57.9
EU6 34.3 65.7
Note: Exact question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether 
you are in favour or against the following? a) The introduction of common EU social insurance schemes (such as 
healthcare, unemployment or pensions) that cover intra-EU migrant workers; b) The introduction of a common 
EU fund compensating national governments and national communities for the costs related to immigration from 
other EU Member States” Response categories “Strongly in favour” and “Somewhat in favour” have been reco-
ded in the category “In favour”, while categories “Somewhat against” and “Strongly against” have been recoded 
in the category “Against”. DK answers (a. 0.65% of the total; b. 0.76% of the total) are excluded. c) “EU Member 
States have decided that their social and economic policies should be brought closer together. Please indicate 
whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. Decisions on EU external borders control and the 
status of extra-EU immigrants and refugees should be made in Brussels.” Response categories “Strongly agree” 
and “Somewhat agree” have been recoded in the category “Agree”, while the categories “Somewhat disagree” 
and “Strongly disagree” have been recoded in the category “Disagree”. Entries are percentages of respondents. 
DK answers (0.86% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
4
When it comes to extra-EU migra-
tion in the entire sample, 65.7% of 
respondents supported the cen-
tralisation in Brussles of decisions 
on the external borders of the EU 
and the status of extra-EU immi-
grants and refugees. 71.2% were 
in favour of the introduction of a 
common EU fund compensating 
national governments and local 
communities for the costs related 
to immigration. However, country 
differences persist also here. In 
Italy – a country facing in the first 
place the influx of migrants from 
Africa to Europe – 79.0% of re-
spondents agreed to entrust the 
EU with management of the issue. 
More than 85% of them were in fa-
vour of compensation funds from 
the EU. By contrast, only 55% of 
Polish respondents agreed that 
the management of extra-EU im-
migration should be decided at 
the EU level.
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G
iven the multifaceted cri-
sis that the EU is suffe-
ring and the novel con-
flict constellation, the 
REScEU survey tried to capture 
what kind of summary image citi-
zen have about the EU. We pro-
posed four different images that 
media and commentators often 
adopt to describe the Union. More 
precisely, the EU was described 
as the ‘common house’ of all Eu-
ropean citizens, as an ‘apartment 
building’ in which national peo-
ples live next to each other like 
good neighbours, a ‘playground’ 
that facilitates (mutually benefi-
cial) economic exchanges among 
Member States and citizens and, 
finally, as a ‘sinking ship’ from whi-
ch Member States should escape 
as fast as they can. The first image 
Table 14.
Image of the EU
Common
House
Apartment
Building Playground
Sinking
Ship
France 22.1 22.4 22.3 33.2
Germany 6.9 54.6 26.6 11.9
Italy 38.1 26.4 15.1 20.4
Poland 31.9 31.4 23.5 13.2
Spain 31.0 22.6 33.8 12.6
Sweden 18.7 28.3 34.5 18.5
United Kingdom 17.9 25.1 24.8 32.3
EU6 24.8 31.0 26.0 18.3
EU6 + UK 23.8 30.1 25.8 20.3
Note: Exact question: “In talking about the European Union, media and people sometimes use the following 
images. Could you please indicate which one comes closest to your view? 1) The EU is the common house of 
all European citizens; 2) The EU is like an apartment building: national peoples live next to each other like good 
neighbours; 3) The EU is a playing ground that facilitates (mutually advantageous) economic exchanges among 
Member States and citizens; 4) The EU is a sinking ship: Member States should escape it as fast as they can”. 
DK answers (0.37% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Images of the EU: 
a house to share, a marketplace
or a sinking ship?
4
34
undoubtedly represents the most 
solidaristic and communitarian 
view, while the second one refers 
to an idea of Europe in which dif-
ferent Member States retain na-
tion-based diversities, but have 
decided to pool sovereignty and 
to empower EU institutions in a 
number of key policy areas. The 
third image - the EU as a play-
ground - suggests that the Union 
basically helps different Member 
States to trade with each other by 
establishing and regulating a com-
mon economic space, while the 
image of the EU as a sinking ship 
describes the view of Eurosceptic 
political forces supporting the ‘exit 
option’.
C
onsidering the entire 
sample, which included 
the EU6 countries and 
the United Kingdom, 
the most appealing image turned 
out to be the apartment building 
(30.1%), followed by the play-
ground (26.0%), the common hou-
se (23.8%) and, finally, the sinking 
ship (20.3%). In Germany, more 
than 54% of respondents decla-
red themselves closest to the ima-
ge of the apartment building, while 
only 6.9% of them opted for the 
common house. By contrast, in 
Italy (38.1%) and Poland (31.9%) 
people opted for the image of the 
common house. In Spain (33.8%) 
and Sweden (34.5%), instead, a 
relative majority identified themsel-
ves with the ‘playground’ option. 
Finally, 33.2% of French15 and 
32.3% of British16  respondents 
saw the EU as a sinking ship that 
should be abandoned as soon as 
possible (see Table 14).
15 The French data reflect in their turn the increasing popularity (and sheer presence in public debates) of the 
Front National, which proposes a referendum on France’s exit from the EU.
16 This percentage is not surprising, for the United Kingdom, where the outcome of the ‘Brexit’ referendum 
essentially ratified this position.
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A European
kaleidoscope 
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T
he outcome of the referen-
dum held on 23 June 2016 
on the exit of the United 
Kingdom (‘Brexit’) from 
the EU represents, undoubtedly, 
the most dramatic moment in the 
process of European integration 
so far. Contrary to all the electoral 
forecasts, British voters decided 
that their country should leave the 
EU. This result forced the Prime 
Minister and leader of the Con-
servative party David Cameron 
- who had campaigned for remai-
ning in the Union - to resign. The 
new Prime Minister, Theresa May, 
has triggered art. 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty in March 2017, opening up 
a period of uncertainty about the 
future relationship between the 
UK and the EU. Considering this 
unexpected outcome, the RE-
ScEU Mass Survey elaborated a 
largely different questionnaire for 
the UK, aimed at exploring pu-
blic opinions on ‘Brexit’ and future 
scenarios.
T
he survey opened with a 
question aimed at captu-
ring the attitudes towards 
the very decision of calling 
such a referendum, made by Da-
vid Cameron back in 2015. The 
first two options suggested, with 
different nuances, that it was the 
“right” decision, whereas the re-
maining two options backed the 
idea that it was a “mistake”. For 
the sake of comparison, this que-
stion was also administered to re-
spondents in the other six coun-
tries.
As Table 15 shows, responden-
ts were almost evenly distributed 
around the four options, with ne-
gative attitudes (definitely, a “mi-
stake”) only slightly higher (29.4%) 
than the percentage of those who 
took a positive (definitely, the “ri-
ght decision”) stance (27.2%). 
Even considering the more nuan-
ced intermediate options, our total 
sample was split down the middle, 
with 49% of positive attitudes and 
51% with negative attitudes.
The most polarized country was 
the United Kingdom, with 35.5% 
An insight into ‘Brexit’
5
The ‘Brexit’ referendum 
with hindsight: good or 
bad choice?
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Table 15.
Assessment of referendum on “Brexit” 
Right
decision
Right
but risky
Mistake but
respect for
the outcome
Mistake and
need to minimize 
the damage
France 29.0 21.6 27.5 22.0
Germany 18.5 31.9 15.3 34.3
Italy 35.5 21.2 17.8 24.7
Poland 24.2 15.2 26.2 34.4
Spain 20.2 19.7 25.7 34.4
Sweden 27.1 23.9 20.3 28.8
United Kingdom 35.5 19.3 18.2 27.1
EU6 25.8 22.4 22.1 29.7
EU6 + UK 27.2 22.0 21.5 29.4
Note: Exact question: “On the last 23rd of June, through a referendum, British citizens voted that the United 
Kingdom should leave the European Union. Please indicate which of these statements on the opportuneness to 
call such a referendum comes closest to your view. 1) It was a right decision because any peaceful expression 
of the popular will should be welcomed; 2) It was a right decision, even though it can be risky to hold a referen-
dum on such a complex issue; 3) It was a mistake to hold a referendum on such a complex issue but the British 
government has to respect its outcome; 4) It was a mistake to hold a referendum on such a complex issue and 
now British institutions must find a way to minimise damage from its outcome.” DK answers (0.50% of the total) 
are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
on the positive side, and 27.1% 
at the opposite end. Neverthe-
less, the gap widens if we look 
just at the opinion expressed by 
those who had voted in the refe-
rendum17 : 38.0% of British actual 
voters thought that calling a refe-
rendum on ‘Brexit’ was a correct 
decision, while 25.2% of them 
thought it was a mistake.
With regard to the other six coun-
tries covered by the survey, Italy 
shows the highest number of re-
spondents who backed the deci-
sion to hold a referendum (35.5%), 
followed by France (29.0%) and 
Sweden (27.1%). The critical front 
is led instead by German (18.5%) 
and Spanish (20.2%) citizens. 
However, in Germany, 31.9% of 
respondents still thought that it 
was a right decision. By contrast, 
Poland (34.4%) and Spain (34.4%) 
were the countries in which the hi-
ghest proportion of respondents 
thought that the referendum was 
a mistake and the British institu-
tions must find a way to minimise 
the damage caused by it.
17 83.2% of the 1,320 respondents included in the British sample
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T
he questionnaire conti-
nued with a battery of 
questions aimed at inve-
stigating the voting choi-
ce of British respondents and 
the factors that are likely to have 
affected it. As shown by the pie 
chart reported in Figure 5, in our 
sample 52.8% of British respon-
dents declared that they had vo-
ted to ‘remain’, whereas 48.1% of 
them declared that they had voted 
to ‘leave’18. 
Figure 5.
Vote choice in the “Brexit”
referendum in our UK sample
Note: Exact question: “Did you vote in the “Brexit” referendum held on June 23rd? 1) Yes, I voted; 2) No, I 
didn’t vote.” The question was administered only to respondents who had previously declared that they voted 
in the “Brexit” referendum. DK answers (0.75% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Remain
53%
Leave
47%
18 Compared to the actual results of the referendum, our sample shows 4.7% more preferences for ‘Remain’ 
(and 4.7% fewer for ‘Leave’). This is not surprising, considering that the survey was conducted more than 
three months after the actual event and, of course, it did not have a forecasting purpose.
Did you vote to 
“remain” or to “leave”?
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Table 16.
Respondents characteristics 
and vote choice
Remain Leave
AGE
18-34 66.6 33.4
35-54 47.3 52.7
55+ 48.8 51.2
EDUCATION
Up to lower secondary qualification 45.8 54.2
Upper-secondary qualification 49.5 50.5
University degree 64.0 36.0
LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT
left 79.5 20.5
centre 47.3 52.7
right 36.7 60.3
Note: See note to Figure 3.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
W
hat factors played a 
role in shaping vo-
ting choices? Table 
16 provides a first 
answer. The percentage of Bri-
tish respondents who voted ‘re-
main’ decreases from those aged 
between 18 and 34 years (66.6%), 
to those aged 55 years or more 
(48.8%), and, eventually, those 
aged between 35 and 54 years 
(47.3%). 
However, it is important to highli-
ght that abstention was highest 
among the youngest responden-
ts (28.5%) compared to the rest 
(19% among 35-54 year olds, and 
6.2% among 55+ year olds). At the 
same time, ‘leavers’ were more 
present among least educated 
respondents (54.2%) and those 
with an upper-secondary qualifi-
cation (50.5%), rather than among 
university graduates (36.0%). In 
addition, the same voting beha-
viour was more frequent among 
right-wing respondents (60.3%), 
followed by centrist ones (52.7%) 
and, far distanced, those located 
on the left side (20.5%)19. 
19 In general, these descriptive results are in line with the analyses of the ‘Brexit’ vote made in the aftermath 
of the referendum. More sophisticated analyses, however, will be necessary in order to better understand 
which voters’ characteristics drove their electoral choices. Other survey questions cast more light on the 
motivations behind voters’ choice, especially for those who voted ‘Leave’.
A matter of age,
education and
ideology
39
F
inally, in Figure 6 we show 
which fears about the EU 
integration process affected 
the ‘Brexit’ vote20. 35.9% 
of British respondents pointed at 
the fear of losing jobs and social 
security, 68.2% at the fear of a 
loss of national identity and cul-
ture, and 75.5% at the risk of a 
weakening of national democracy. 
Finally, 76.8% of respondents de-
clared that the fear of an increase 
of national income being paid into 
the EU budget was a key driver of 
their vote. In other terms, the per-
ceived political impact of the EU 
integration process seem to have 
affected ‘leavers’ more than the 
economic impact21. 
I
n a question administered only 
to respondents who voted ‘le-
ave’, we asked whether they 
would have voted to remain, if 
the EU had made major conces-
Figure 6.
Aspects of the EU unification process that influen-
ced the British respondents’ decision to vote “Le-
ave”
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Note: Exact question: “Some people have fears about the process of European unification. Please 
indicate whether or not the following statements influenced your decision to vote “Leave” in the “Brexit” 
referendum: 1) The loss of jobs and social security; 2) The loss of national identity and culture; 3) A 
growing share of national income being paid into the EU budget; 4) A weakening of national demo-
cracy.” The question was administered only to respondents who had previously declared that they 
voted “Leave” in the “Brexit” referendum . DK answers (1. 1,10% of the total; 2. 0.22% of the total; 3. 
0.66% of the total; 4. 1.77% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
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20 A similar analysis has already been presented for the other six countries (see Table 6). Each of the bars 
plotted in the graph of Figure 10 indicates the percentage of respondents who answered ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the 
four item proposed to them, regarding the impact of European integration. These items were: (1) the loss of 
jobs and social security; (2) the loss of national identity and culture; (3) a growing share of national income 
being paid into the EU budget; (4) a weakening of national democracy.
21 Although the EU budget motivation can be considered an economic aspect, the development of the natio-
nal budget and the decision on how to allocate financial resources is essentially a political decision. A larger 
proportion of national income paid into the EU budget, means indeed a loss in decision-making power for 
the British government.
Why did you vote to le-
ave the Union?
40
Figure 7.
Vote choice if the EU had made 
major concessions to the UK
who voted “leave”
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of respondents
YES NO
Note: Exact question: “Some people say the process of European unification should be strengthe-
ned. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your position using 
a 11-point-scale where ‘0’ means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and ‘10’ means it ‘should be 
strengthened’. DK answers (0.3% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
27,8 72,2
sions to the UK in order to keep it 
as a Member State.
Have you changed your 
mind?
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A
lmost one respondent 
out of three among those 
who voted ‘leave’ would 
have changed their choi-
ce if the EU had made major con-
cessions (see Figure 7). If we put 
this result in relation to the voting 
choice declared by our respon-
dents, the percentage for the 
‘remain’ option would have been 
significantly higher. Table 17 di-
splays instead how British respon-
dents would vote if the referendum 
were to be called a second time.
Table 17.
Vote choice of British respondents if 
the referendum was called another time
Remain Leave Would not vote
Those who voted “Remain” 96.5 2.2 1.3
Those who voted “Leave” 7.7 89.7 2.6
Note: Exact question: “Suppose the referendum was called another time. How would you vote? 1) I would 
vote for the UK to remain in the EU; 2) I would vote for the UK to leave the EU; 3) I would not vote.” DK answers 
(0.31% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey. 
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Figure 8.
Simulation of the outcome
of a second referendum on “Brexit”
Note: See note to Table 15.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
Bremain
56%
Brexit
44%
M
ost respondents would 
make the same choi-
ce: 95.6% of those 
who voted ‘remain’ and 
89.7% of those who voted ‘leave’. 
It is remarkable to note, however, 
that the slight change in preferen-
ce would lead to a reversal of the 
outcome in case of a second refe-
rendum, with a 56% for ‘remain’ and 
44% for ‘leave’ (see Figure 8).
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Figure 9.
British respondents’ opinion on the potential new 
free trade agreement that could be signed betwe-
en UK and the EU
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Note: Exact question: “Some commentators suggest that the British government may now be willing 
to sign a new free trade agreement with the EU. Which of the following statements come closest to 
your view? 1) The British government should negotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU, even if 
this means allowing EU citizens to freely live and work in the UK; 2) The British government should ne-
gotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU but only if this means not allowing EU citizens to freely 
live and work in the UK; 3) The British government should not negotiate a new free trade agreement 
with the EU at all.” DK answers (2.12% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
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A
s we carried out the sur-
vey, the post-referendum 
were still uncertain. Ne-
vertheless, the REScEU 
Mass Survey included a series of 
questions aimed at identifying opi-
nions on some potential implica-
tions of ‘Brexit’.
First, we asked British citizens 
which potential new UK-EU tra-
de agreement was closest to their 
preference. We connected the 
question with the issue of the free 
movement of persons and wor-
kers within the EU. The following 
options were given: a new free 
trade agreement implying free mo-
vement of EU citizens to live and 
work in the UK; a new free trade 
agreement, but only if this means 
not allowing EU citizens to live 
and work freely in the UK; no new 
free trade agreement at all. Once 
again, the sample was split down 
the middle.
51% were in favour of a new free 
trade agreement implying complete 
free movement, whereas the rest 
was split: 36.9% opted for an agre-
ement conditional upon entry, while 
12.1% refused any deal (see Figure 
9).
Post ‘Brexit’ scenarios
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Figure 10.
British respondents’ opinions
about United Kingdom after “Brexit”
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Note: Exact questions: Considering the outcome of the “Brexit” referendum , would you say the financial 
situation of your household in the next 12 months will improve a lot, will improve somewhat, will stay about the 
same, will get somewhat worse or will get a lot worse? (Left bar); Considering the outcome of the “Brexit” refe-
rendum , would you say the situation of the national economy in the UK over the next 12 months will improve a 
lot, will improve somewhat, will stay about the same, will get somewhat worse or will get a lot worse? (Centre 
bar); To what extent do you think that the outcome of the “Brexit” referendum it is a good or bad thing for the 
international role of the UK? (Right bar). Options “It will improve a lot” and “It will improve somewhat” have been 
recoded in the category “Improve”, while options “It will get somewhat worse” and “It will get a lot worse” have 
been recoded in the category “Get worse”. DK answers (Left bar: 0.57% of the total; Centre bar: 1.44% of the 
total; Right bar: 0.23% of the total) are excluded.
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.
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F
inally, we asked respon-
dents to share their feelin-
gs and expectations about 
the future. First, does the 
outcome of the referendum re-
serve good or bad consequences 
for the UK’s role on the interna-
tional stage? And, second, how 
will Brexit affect the development 
of households’ finances and the 
national economy, over the next 
twelve months? 
Figure 10 shows that 40.7% had 
bad feelings about the interna-
tional role of the UK after Brexit, 
whereas 39.7% had more positive 
attitudes. Only 19.7% of respon-
dents thought that it made no dif-
ference. 
More than half of respondents 
(52.3%) thought that the outcome 
of the ‘Brexit’ referendum would 
not affect their financial situation, 
followed by 26.8% that expect a 
worsening, and 20.9% that have 
positive expectations. Respon-
dents were far more pessimistic 
about the outlook of the national 
economy, with 40% expecting a 
downturn. 
Nevertheless, if we add up those 
who expected no change (33.1%) 
and optimists (26.9%) we end up 
with a majority that does not feel 
particular anxieties. All in all, we 
can say that the outcome of the 
referendum was driven more by 
political motivations linked to the 
issue of national sovereignty and 
international prestige, rather than 
to pocketbook calculations.
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Conclusions
6
T
he main messages stem-
ming from the Resceu 
mass survey have alrea-
dy been summarized on 
page 6. We know that public opi-
nion polls need to be taken with a 
grain of salt. Yet, the general indi-
cation  is clear: a majority of citi-
zens living in largest EU member 
states (UK excluded) still believe 
in the EU and is ready to support 
a number of policy reforms aimed 
at constructively responding to 
the four lines of conflict now cha-
racterizing EU politics. If this is the 
case, how is it possible then that 
Eurosceptic minorities make the 
headlines all over the Continent in 
public debates? Why have the so-
lidaristic attitudes revealed by the 
survey been ignored over the past 
years of crisis management? To 
make the point clear: data show 
that even a majority of German ci-
tizens back EU wide solidarity me-
chanisms.
European leaders should care 
about these results. If there is 
anything missing in European poli-
tics, it is not a pro-European elec-
toral and social bedrock, but po-
litical leaders that are able to give 
a voice to this silent majority. The 
political groups that have driven 
the process of European integra-
tion until now (liberals, Christian 
democrats and social democrats) 
are in front of a historical failure. If 
the EU is on the brink of collapse, 
it is simply because its élites are 
unable to suggest an alternative 
to “souverainisme”, on one hand, 
and fiscal austerity, on the other. 
An alternative capable of reassu-
ring worried voters that the EU 
does have a “caring” face and that 
it is not a threat for jobs, demo-
cracy and national cultures. The 
hardest challenge is  to reflect on 
possible standards of pan-Euro-
pean solidarity: among EU citizens 
(in particular, mobile citizens) and 
among Member States, particu-
larly within the euro-zone.  The 
results of this survey indicate that 
EU citizens are already capable to 
distinguish between domestic and 
cross-national solidarity and are 
ready to support steps towards 
enhancing the latter.
Recent elections in the Nether-
lands, Austria and especially Fran-
ce have shown that the pro-EU si-
lent majority can be mobilized.  As 
aptly noted by Mario Draghi, the 
“silent majority has regained its 
voice, its pride, and its self-confi-
dence” (Draghi, 2017)  
If there is any deficit in this Union, 
it comes in the form of a lack of 
ideas, initiatives, and assumption 
of historic responsibility by the po-
litical elite. If things do not rapidly 
change, we all shall pay dear for 
it, condemning our sons and dau-
ghters to live in a divided and im-
poverished Europe, with little or no 
influence at all on the global stage.
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EScEU “Reconciling Eco-
nomic and Social Europe: 
Values, Ideas and Politi-
cs” (http://resceu.eu/) is 
a research project funded by the 
European Research Council (ERC 
Advanced Grant: 340534) invol-
ving the University of Milan and 
the Research Centre “Luigi Einau-
di” based in Turin. The project is 
directed by prof. Maurizio Ferre-
ra (University of Milan) and aims 
to study the complex interplay 
between the European Union 
and national welfare states and to 
analyse how the recent crisis has 
exacerbated the tensions betwe-
en these two dimensions.
Data presented in this study are 
the results of a public opinion sur-
vey conducted in seven countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The fieldwork has been 
conducted between 8 September 
2016 and 24 November 2016 on 
a sample of about 1320 respon-
dents aged 18 or older in each 
country, for a total of 9326 re-
spondents. The sample has been 
built through a quota sampling 
around gender, age (six catego-
ries: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 
55-64, 65+), educational level 
(three categories: up to lower se-
condary degree, upper secondary 
degree, university degree) and 
NUTS1 macro-area of residence. 
A mixed method adopting CAWI 
and CATI has been applied. The 
CAWI survey, conducted by To-
luna, interviewed about 1000 re-
spondents voluntarily registered to 
the company online panel. In the 
CATI survey, conducted by UBM 
Consulting, exactly the same que-
stionnaire has been administered 
to a sample of 320 respondents 
per country aged 55 or older, who 
represent a segment of the popu-
lation with a lower access to inter-
Methodological note
net compared to younger citizens. 
Respondents have been con-
tacted via landline or cell phones 
selected through random-digit 
dialing (RDD). While the landline 
sample was randomly drawn from 
the countries telephone registry, 
a pure RDD system was used for 
mobile interviewing. In this case, 
random prefixes, indicating the 
service/network provider, were 
associated with a predefined set 
of random numbers assigned to 
the user.
To correct the coverage of the so-
cio-demographic characteristics 
of the population (adult citizens 
resident in the seven countries 
included in the research determi-
ned by the Eurostat Census 2011) 
post-stratification weights (gen-
derXage groupsXmacro-areaXe-
ducation) have been applied to 
our sample data.
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ith the establishment 
of EMU and, in par-
ticular, during the 
euro-crisis, a visible 
friction has emerged between 
“Economic” and “Social” Europe. 
The EU’s “social deficit” has trig-
gered an increasing politicization 
of redistributive issues within su-
pranational, transnational and na-
tional arenas. Various lines of con-
flict have taken shape, revolving 
around who questions (who are 
“we”, i.e. issues of identity and in-
clusion/exclusion); what questions 
(how much redistribution within 
and across the “we” collectivities) 
and who decides questions (the 
locus of authority that can produ-
ce and guarantee organised soli-
darity). The key challenge facing 
today political leaders is how to 
“glue” the Union together as a re-
cognizable, functioning and legiti-
mate polity. This requires a double 
rebalancing: l) between the logic 
of supranational and transnational 
“opening” and the logic of natio-
nal “closure”; 2) between the logic 
of “economic stability” and that of 
“social solidarity”, on the other.
How can we document empirical-
ly the clash between “Economic” 
and “Social” Europe? What are its 
causes? Is “reconciliation” possi-
ble, and how? These are the fun-
damental research questions of 
REScEU. The empirical documen-
tation/analysis focuses on four cle-
arly observable lines of conflicts, 
centered on the following issues: l) 
the overall mission of the EU -mar-
ket-making vs market-correcting; 
2) the issue of cross-national tran-
sfers and solidarity; 3) the issue 
of free movement and access to 
domestic welfare;4) and the issue 
of competences, i.e. supranatio-
nal integration vs domestic auto-
nomy. For each line of conflict, the 
following data are being collected: 
political and institutional event 
data; attitudinal data (through two 
original surveys - one mass and 
one elite - covering 7 countries;); 
social media data (twitter analy-
sis); text analysis data. A number 
of qualitative case studies are also 
being conducted on specific con-
flict cases.
Causal analysis builds on the 
The REScEU project
so-called “state-building” tradition 
in political science. Building on the 
neo-Weberian and neo-Rokka-
nian literature, the project has 
elaborated an original theoretical 
framework, centered on the inte-
raction between the political sphe-
re (where choices are made by 
elected leaders and state officials) 
and the intellectual sphere (where 
ideas and broad normative visions 
are generated). Though speci-
fically linked to the project, this 
framework has a wide and gene-
ral scope and has the potential of 
turning into a novel approach for 
macro-political analysis as such. 
In the light of our framework, the 
“deconciliation” between Eco-
nomic and Social Europe can be 
linked to two perverse dynamics. 
The first dynamic is political and 
institutional and has increasingly 
constricted the European politi-
cal sphere through an excess of 
formalization (rigid rules and fixed 
targets), largely self-defeating in 
terms of polity maintenance. The 
second dynamic is intellectual and 
has promoted and entrenched – 
especially in supranational institu-
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tions, under German influence- an 
econocratic paradigm exclusively 
centred on instrumental objecti-
ves, which has dried up alterna-
tive symbolic resources and ob-
structed the elaboration of forward 
looking visions, more attentive to 
the “caring” side of the integration 
project. Both dynamics are the 
object of intensive empirical and 
explanatory exploration, including 
through specific case studies.
The project rests on the assu-
mption that “reconciliation” is not 
only normatively desirable but also 
functionally necessary in order to 
rescue the European project. Ba-
sed on the mid-term results of the 
project, we do believe that recon-
ciliation is possible, but only if ca-
refully crafted through an extraor-
dinary mobilization of political and 
intellectual resources. Through a 
fruitful dialogue between different 
disciplinary perspectives (political 
science, law, philosophy, econo-
mics) the REScEU team is enga-
ged in a forward-looking exercise 
for identifying adequate symbolic 
frames and policy solutions (such 
as the establishment of a fully-fle-
dged European Social Union) as 
well as the potential actors who 
might bring about transformative 
change.
The findings of the mass survey 
show a surprising and unexpected 
attitudinal potential for reconcilia-
tion. A vast majority of voters is si-
lently hiding under the Eurosceptic 
blankets, While this silent majori-
ty shows notable fears about the 
social and political implications 
of integration, it also favors con-
tinuing EU membership, provided 
that the EU become more social-
ly oriented. Voters seem ready to 
support a much higher degree of 
pan-European solidarity than cur-
rently available, including a favo-
rable attitude vis-à-vis some of the 
policy solutions imagined by the 
REScEU team.
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